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1 INTRODUCTION 
On 16 September 2016, the High Court 
of Swaziland delivered judgment in a 
case involving the interpretation of the 
limitation clause in the Swaziland 
Constitution. This was in the case of 
Maseko and others v Prime Minister of 
Swaziland and others (Maseko),1 in 
which certain sections of the Sedition 
and Subversive Activities Act 46 of 1938 
(Sedition Act) as well as the Suppression 
of Terrorism Act 3 of 2008 (STA) were 
declared unconstitutional. It should be 
noted that there is a general reluctance 
within the judiciary to enquire into or 
rule upon the constitutionality of 
1 [2016] SZHC 180. 
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impugned legislation, and quite often constitutional challenges fail at the preliminary 
stage of determining locus standi. The Court’s response to the legal challenge in Maseko 
is thus very pertinent to constitutional development in that this was one of the very few 
instances in which a Swaziland court applied the limitation analysis to declare 
legislation unconstitutional, and did not shelter behind a common law inspired 
conceptualisation of standing. The only other time this was done was to declare the 
common law marital power of the husband invalid on account of its clash with the 
equality clause in the Constitution in the case of Sihlongonyane v Sihlongonyane 
(Sihlongonyane).2 However, even in Sihlongonyane, a proper limitation analysis could 
not be undertaken since the Swaziland Constitution does not have a general limitation 
clause. The Court was merely guided by the equality clause in sections 20 and 28 which 
regulate the rights and freedoms of women. It is worth noting that in the Swaziland Bill 
of Rights litigation context, there is a strong inclination to cling to common law 
principles, even when dealing with constitutional litigation. For instance, standing is 
still viewed from the angle of the common law when in fact it is now regulated by 
section 35 of the 2005 Constitution in so far as constitutional litigation goes. To 
demonstrate this: in Sihlongonyane, there was an unsuccessful attempt to have the case 
thrown out on the basis that the female applicant did not have standing due to the 
marital power of the husband. The Court had to first deal with that challenge before 
determining the constitutionality or otherwise of the common law marital power of the 
husband. 
In Maseko, however, the Court was divided on whether the applicants had 
standing or not. Whilst the majority judgment accepted that they did have standing, the 
dissenting judge held otherwise. What makes the majority judgment in Maseko even 
more interesting is the fact that the impugned pieces of legislation were utilised for 
political purposes, namely to, suppress dissenting voices. In the light of an established 
pattern of political clampdown on both dissenting voices and the judiciary, such a bold 
and progressive move is indeed commendable. The case marked the first time that the 
Swaziland courts acknowledged that the Constitution is a living document and that as 
such they had a duty to interpret the Bill of Rights in accordance with international 
standards, influenced by the universality of fundamental rights.3 
2 BACKGROUND TO THE LITIGATION 
On 18 June 2009, the applicant, Mr Thulani Maseko (a lawyer and a human rights 
activist), filed an application in which he sought to have the Court declare the entire 
Sedition Act null and void for its inconsistency with sections 1, 2 and 24 of the 
Swaziland Constitution. In the alternative, he sought to impugn specific sections of the 
Act, namely, sections 3, 4 and 5, in that the said sections are wide, overbroad and 
contrary to sections 1, 2 and 24 of the Constitution. Section 2 of the Swaziland 
Constitution asserts the supremacy of the Constitution, while section 1 provides that 
2 [2013] SZHC 144.  
3 At para 41. 
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Swaziland is a unitary, sovereign and democratic Kingdom, but does not proffer a 
definition of the term "democracy". The Head of State has, however, attempted to give 
guidance on what the particular form of democracy that Swaziland practises entails. 
Speaking at the UN General Assembly’s 68th Session in 2013, King Mswati III stated that 
Swaziland operates what he terms a "monarchical democracy". In other words, the 
monarchy is at the centre of Swaziland’s form of democracy, which is a "marriage 
between the monarchy and the ballot box".  It combines the monarchy and the popular 
will. The ballot box is regarded as the will of the people, which provides advice and 
counsel to the King and serves to ensure transparency and accountability.4 
Maseko’s application was followed by a series of other similarly worded 
applications, which the Court directed should be consolidated with the Maseko matter. 
The other matters sought a similar remedy and attacked both the Sedition Act as well as 
certain provisions of the STA. The other three applicants were also political activists 
and, like Maseko, had been in frequent collision with the State for their political 
opinions and their association with individuals who held similar dissenting political 
views. These are: Mario Masuku, a member and president of the banned political party, 
People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO); Maxwell Dlamini, a student activist 
and member of PUDEMO; and Mlungisi Makhanya, a political activist and Secretary-
General of PUDEMO. Over and above the attack on the Sedition Act, Masuku sought to 
challenge certain provisions of the STA as unconstitutional, whilst Makhanya attacked 
the STA only. The other basis for the challenge to the Sedition Act was that it violated 
the applicants’ freedom of association and assembly contained in section 25 of the 
Constitution. 
The respondents in the matter were the Prime Minister of Swaziland in his 
official capacity as head of the Executive (a delegated function which constitutionally 
vests in the King),5 the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. The Attorney-General was also sued in his nominal capacity as the 
legal advisor to all government departments. 
The pusillanimous behaviour of the Swazi judiciary in relation to standing and Bill of 
Rights litigation in general could be explained by the failure to embrace what can be 
called "transformative constitutionalism", favouring instead liberal or formal 
constitutionalism. Transformative constitutionalism embraces the idea of the 
Constitution as a living document, whose interpretation results in an organic reform of 
society and its institutions, with the people at the centre of that transformative process. 
There are many reasons why the Swazi judiciary could fail to embrace transformative 
constitutionalism. It could genuinely be the result of a bench that had no idea of how to 
proceed with determining the limitation of a right. It could also be the fact that the 
Swaziland judiciary faced immense pressure from the executive branch over previous 
years, which in 2002 saw judges of the then Court of Appeal resign en masse following 
4 United Nations, ‘Swaziland’, General Assembly of the United Nations 68th Session (25 September 2013) 
available at https://gadebate.un.org/en/68/swaziland (accessed 14 February 2017). 
5 The Prime Minister is appointed by the King as provided by s 67(1) of the Constitution of Swaziland. 
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the Prime Minister’s interference in their work.6 It could also be a result of interference 
from within, which characterised the state of the judiciary during the tenure of former 
Chief Justice Michael Ramodibedi, who controversially referred to himself as "Makulu 
baas" (an apartheid era term used to refer to an autocratic White male in a position of 
power). During Ramodibedi’s tenure, judges did not have the independence to carry out 
their duties, and risked being fired for delivering unfavourable judgments. Instructive in 
this regard is the case of Justice Thomas Masuku,7 whom Ramodibedi had fired after he 
wrote metaphorically in his judgment in Aaron Maseko v The Commissioner of Police that 
it is "incomprehensible that His Majesty could conceivably speak with a forked 
tongue".8 Ramodibedi hastily convened a tribunal in which he sat as a complainant, a 
prosecutor, a witness and a judge, and found Masuku guilty. This opened the way for 
impeachment, and Judge Masuku was later fired.  
Ramodibedi went on to issue practice directives to all judges and registrars of 
courts, not to entertain matters in which the King was cited.9 Given this edict, it is highly 
probable that judges might have engaged in self-censorship, especially in dealing with 
constitutional challenges, which are largely viewed as an attack on the King himself. 
What makes this possibility even more plausible is that with the departure of 
Ramodibedi after facing corruption charges in 2015, the judiciary seems to have 
regained boldness to not only admit such matters, but to also strike down offending 
provisions that have been used to preserve "monarchical democracy". It is notable that 
the progressive majority judgment in Maseko departs from the position adopted by the 
Swaziland courts, which not so long ago endorsed the faulty notion that the King can do 
no wrong.10 This was in the case involving the Law Society of Swaziland in which the 
exercise of public power by the King to appoint judges was questioned.11 The bench, 
which consisted of three acting judges, dismissed the matter citing the immunity of the 
King under both the Constitution and customary law. 
Turning to Maseko, it is worth noting that Mamba J, when delivering the majority 
judgment, was alive to the way in which the judgment would be received by the political 
authority in Swaziland. Hence the learned judge alluded to the fact that the judgment 
should not be seen as being contrary to the "Swazi way of life".12 The learned judge 
6 Maseko T "The drafting of the Constitution of Swaziland, 2005" (2008) 8(2) African Human Rights Law 
Journal 312, 328. This happened after the Court of Appeal delivered two judgments, the first of which 
declared that the King lacked authority to make law by decree; whilst the second one committed the 
Commissioner of Police for contempt of court. The Swaziland Government acting through the Prime 
Minister issued a statement that it would not comply with judgments of the Court of Appeal. The 
resignation en masse of the judges left Swaziland without a Court of Appeal for over two years. 
7 Dube A & Nhlabatsi S "The King can do no wrong: The impact of The Law Society of Swaziland v Simelane 
NO and Others on constitutionalism" (2016) 16 African Journal of Human Rights Law 273. 
8 Aaron Maseko v Commissioner of Police and another [2011] SZHC 66. 
9 Dube A "Does SADC provide a remedy for environmental rights violations in weak legal regimes? A case 
study of iron ore mining in Swaziland" (2013) 3 SADC Law Journal 270. 
10 Dube A & Nhlabatsi S (2016) 278. 
11 Law Society of Swaziland NO v Simelane and others [2014] SZHC 179. 
12 Para 41. 
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seemed to be aware of certain segments within Swazi society (especially within 
traditional structures) which regard fundamental rights as "unSwazi" and against 
customary law. He emphasized that the values and aspirations that informed his 
reasoning are not foreign but are contained in the very same Constitution. He went on 
to state that his judgment was an attempt to reaffirm the universality of human rights. 
Mamba J also invoked section 2(2) of the Constitution, which places a positive duty on 
everyone to uphold and defend the Constitution. This was a very progressive, if not 
revolutionary, judgment. The judge invoked his resolute, firm and unshakeable belief in 
traditional institutions, justice, democracy and human rights. 
Some of the values the judge alluded to are contained in the preamble of the 
Constitution. It is now settled that the preamble is critical in assisting the Court to 
interpret fundamental rights.13 It is as much an important source of law as are the 
operative provisions of a constitution, even though it does not contain any positive 
norms. Preambles often outline a society's fundamental goals.14 These may be universal 
objectives, such as the advancement of justice, equality, democracy and human rights, as 
well as economic goals.15 In essence, it contains the supreme goals of any nation. 
The preamble to the Constitution stipulates, amongst others: “Whereas it is 
necessary to blend the good institutions of traditional law and custom with those of an 
open and democratic society so as to promote transparency and the social, economic 
and cultural development of our Nation." 
The preamble further provides that the Constitution was the culmination of a 
review of various laws, decrees, customs and practices with a view to promoting good 
governance, the rule of law, respect for institutions, and the progressive development of 
Swaziland society. This encapsulates the notion of transformative constitutionalism. It 
resonates with Karl Klare’s idea of transformative constitutionalism which he dubs "a 
long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed to … transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power 
relationship in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction".16 
This preambular provision takes into consideration the fact that there are 
traditional values that pre-dated the Constitution, and that they are very critical to the 
existence of an open and democratic society. These could include values, such as ubuntu, 
which can be traced back to the teachings of the African sage, Khem.17 This value is aptly 
13 Dube A & Nhlabatsi S "On amorphous terms, terrorism and a feeble judiciary: analysing the dissenting 
judgment in Maseko v Prime Minister of Swaziland and others" (2017) 12(1) International Journal of 
African Renaissance Studies – Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinary 157, 171 – 172. 
14 For instance, in S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3 the concept of ubuntu appeared in the postamble of the 
South African Interim Constitution. In para 237, the Constitutional Court indicated that despite that 
reality, the concept permeated the entire constitution, and went on to use ubuntu to interpret the rights in 
the Bill of Rights. 
15 Orgad L "The preamble in constitutional interpretation" (2010) 8(4) International Journal of 
Constitution Law 717. 
16 Klare K "Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism" (1998) South African Journal of Human 
Rights 146, 157. 
17 Dube & Nhlabatsi (2016) 275. 
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captured in the African idiom umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (isiZulu, isiNdebele, 
isiXhosa), motho ke motho ka batho (seSotho and seTswana). This philosophy basically 
dictates that everyone must be given his due on account of common humanity. This is a 
horizontal relationship that regulates inter-human relations between individuals. 
The notion of ubuntu (or botho in seSotho) also extended to relations between 
the governor and the governed. In pre-colonial Africa, the government or the State was 
personified in the king or queen. However, absolutism was frowned upon and regulated 
by the African philosophy inkosi yinkosi ngabantu (isiZulu, isiNdebele, isiXhosa), inkhosi 
yinkhosi ngebantfu (siSwati) kgosi ke kgosi ka batho (seTswana), and morena ke morena 
ka batho (seSotho).18 The legitimacy of a government, and by necessary extension, of 
the king, flowed from his ability to treat the people under his leadership with ubuntu. 
This is a vertical relationship which regulates the interactions between the State and the 
individual. It provides checks and balances for the exercise of public power even in so-
called monarchical democracy. In S v Makwanyane (Makwanyane),19 it was said that 
although the notion of ubuntu appears for the first time in the postamble of the South 
African Constitution, it permeates the Constitution generally, and more importantly the 
Bill of Rights. The concept was held by the Court to embody humanness, social justice 
and fairness. This is because treatment that is cruel, inhumane or degrading is bereft of 
ubuntu.20 Hence, authoritarianism would go against both the philosophy of ubuntu and 
inkosi yinkosi ngabantu. In essence, authoritarianism would violate both the horizontal 
and the vertical relationships. 
It is therefore inconceivable that an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the King of Swaziland and his government conduct public affairs 
would be regarded as treasonous; and that the laws sanctioning the punishment of such 
conduct could possibly pass constitutional muster. 
3 THE ISSUE OF STANDING 
Before the Court dealt with the core of the constitutional challenge in Maseko, the 
litigants first had to satisfy it that they had standing to pursue the matter. As stated 
above, standing in the Swaziland context has been used by the courts in the past to 
jettison constitutional matters. This was achieved by narrowly construing what 
standing entails.21 However, in this particular case, each of the applicants had been 
charged with the crime of contravening provisions of the two respective Acts. Each 
18 Dube & Nhlabatsi (2016) 275. 
19 [1995] ZACC 3 para 237. 
20 At para 225. 
21 Sithole N.O. and others v The Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland and others [2008] SZSC 22. In 
casu, the Supreme Court confirmed a decision of the High Court that held that political parties and 
organised labour organisations had no legal capacity to challenge the constitutional validity of the 
constitution making process. The Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had no locus standi to 
challenge the Constitution as at the time of its drafting the 1973 King’s Proclamation was operative as a 
grundnorm in Swaziland. This is the same Proclamation that introduced a ban on political parties, which 
ban subsists up to today. 
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applicant was therefore challenging the validity of either of the laws in the application 
before the Court. The Court did not dwell much on this issue since the respondents did 
not object to the applicants’ claim that they had locus standi to institute the 
proceedings.22 
Although the Court did not elaborate on how it came to its conclusion that the 
applicants did have standing, such standing flows from section 35 of the Swaziland 
Constitution. It provides: 
"Where a person alleges that any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter has been, is being, or 
is likely to be, contravened in relation to that person or a group of which that person is a member 
(or, in the case of a person who is detained, where any other person alleges such a contravention 
in relation to the detained person) then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the 
same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) may apply to the High 
Court for redress." 
From the above, it is clear that the following three classes of persons can approach the 
High Court for redress in the event of a violation of a right in the Bill of Rights: 
(i) A person acting in their own interest; 
(ii) A person acting on behalf of a group of which that person is a member; or  
(iii) A person acting on behalf of another who is detained. 
 
4 THE MAIN ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT 
All the applicants in the case contended that the provisions of the two impugned pieces 
of legislation violated their respective rights enshrined in sections 24 and 25 of the 
Constitution.23 This effectively made their application a constitutional matter, falling 
within the jurisdictional ambit of the High Court. Section 151 of the Constitution clothes 
the High Court with unlimited original jurisdiction in both criminal and civil matters, as 
well as jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights and "to hear and determine any 
matter of a constitutional nature". The Constitution is silent on what a "constitutional 
matter" is, and the Court did not elaborate on this point in coming to its conclusion that 
the applicants’ matter was a constitutional one.24  
Constitutional matters are those that involve the interpretation, protection or 
enforcement of the Constitution. In other words, they have to do with the direct 
application of the Bill of Rights.25 These are matters that involve a constitutional 
challenge to law or conduct, based on an unjustified infringement of a fundamental 
right. The applicants mainly contended that the actions that formed the bedrock of the 
charges they faced under the two Acts were done in furtherance of their fundamental 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights. They relied on freedom of expression as well as 
that of association, or such other related rights, to claim that the infringement of their 
22 At para 6. 
23 At para 8. 
24 At para 8. 
25 Du Plessis M, Penfold G, & Brickhill J  Constitutional Litigation (Cape Town: Juta 2013) 19. 
Page | 18  
 
                                                 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 22 (2018) 
 
rights ran counter to these fundamental entitlements. This was therefore a direct 
application of the Bill of Rights and as such the matter was a constitutional one. 
It should be noted that constitutional matters are not confined to the direct 
application of the Bill of Rights. There exists another form of constitutional matter, 
which can be referred to as an indirect application of the Bill of Rights. This may arise 
by virtue of sections 35(3) and (4) of the Constitution.26 These sections give a discretion 
to a trial court, acting mero motu during the interpretation of any law, to refer any 
matter to the High Court for constitutional determination. Where a constitutional 
question is raised during trial by a party to the proceedings, the trial court is bound to 
refer the matter to the High Court for adjudication. Subsection (3) provides: 
"If in any proceedings in any court subordinate to the High Court any question arises as to the 
contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter, the person presiding in that court may, 
and shall where a party to the proceedings so requests, stay the proceedings and refer the 
question to the High Court unless, in the judgment of that person, which shall be final, the raising 
of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious." 
In such cases, the Bill of Rights does not apply directly in that it is not invoked by the 
parties as the basis of their legal challenge. Rather, it arises by way of a question during 
non-constitutional proceedings, either because the presiding officer invokes the 
constitutional question, or because a party to the proceedings does so. The Bill of Rights 
then applies to that matter indirectly. This is another form of a constitutional matter 
sanctioned by the Swaziland Constitution. Such referral has the effect of staying the 
initial proceedings until the constitutional question is determined.27 It is worth noting 
that the referral in Sihlongonyane was made because the judge did not want to 
determine the matter alone. He therefore referred it to a full bench of the High Court. 
The section 35 provision on referrals governs constitutional matters which emanate 
from subordinate courts, such as Magistrates Courts, and not the High Court. 
This is different from the position in South Africa, in that Swaziland’s section 
35(3) allows for indirect application of the Bill of Rights in proceedings in "any court", 
including Magistrates' Courts, labour courts and traditional courts.  In the South African 
context, Magistrates' Courts cannot pronounce on the validity of any law or conduct.28 
Section 110(2) of the South African Magistrates Courts Act 32 of 1994 stipulates that 
when a claim of invalidity is made in regard to a law or conduct due to it being in 
conflict with the Constitution, the magistrate must continue and decide the matter on 
the assumption that the law or conduct in question is valid. Any aggrieved party is free 
to pursue the question in the High Court. The South African position mirrors the one 
favoured by the dissenting judge in his opinion in Maseko, as will be discussed below. 
26 Section 35(4) provides: 
"Where any question is referred to the High Court in pursuance of subsection (3) the High Court 
shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose 
of the case in accordance with that decision or, it that decision is subject to an appeal to the 
Supreme Court, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court." 
27 Sihlongonyane para 12. 
28 De Vos P & Freedman W (eds) South African Constitutional Law in Context (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press Southern Africa 2014) 224. 
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5 LIMITATION OF RIGHTS IN THE SWAZILAND CONSTITUTION 
As highlighted above, the Swaziland Constitution does not contain a general limitation 
clause but employs internal limitations contained within specific provisions.29 In most 
instances, the internal limitation clauses are a relic of the colonial era, when 
fundamental rights were made subservient to considerations of defence, public order, 
public safety and public morality. The two rights invoked by the applicants, namely, 
freedom of expression and freedom of association, are also subject to these internal 
limitations.  
Section 24 of the Constitution provides: "A person has a right of freedom of 
expression and opinion". This includes the freedom to hold, receive, and impart 
information and ideas without interference. However, these freedoms are subject to an 
arbitrary limitation as indicated above. Section 24(3) provides: 
"Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision 
that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality 
or public health." 
The section goes on to list other instances where interference with one’s freedom of 
expression will not be held to be inconsistent with the constitutional protection. These 
include instances where the interference is required for the purpose of (i) protecting 
the rights of others; (ii) preventing disclosure of information received in confidence; 
(iii) maintaining the authority and independence of the courts; and (iv) regulating the 
operation of telephony and other technological and communication channels.  
The limitation analysis is a two-stage process. First, there must exist a limitation 
or violation of a right contained in the Bill of Rights. Once that is established, the next 
question should be: Is there a law sanctioning the violation of the right? In other words, 
was the conduct complained of done under the authority of any law? If the answer is no, 
the enquiry ends there, for a limitation that does not flow from any law cannot be 
justified under the Swaziland Constitution. If the answer is yes, the court can now move 
on to the next question, where it seeks to establish the purpose of the limitation.  
Here the court is guided by the main reason for which the law was passed. It 
must therefore investigate whether the law limiting the right was passed to serve any of 
the purposes listed in sections 24(3) and 25(3) of the Constitution. These include public 
29 See section 36 of the South African Constitution which provides: 
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including- 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose." 
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safety, public morality, public health, the interest of defence, the rights and reputations 
of others, and protecting confidential information. If the law is not found to be 
advancing any of those purposes, the enquiry ends there. A limitation cannot be found 
to be legitimate if it does not serve any purpose, that is, any of the purposes listed in 
sections 24(3) and 25(3). If the limitation is found to be connected to the listed 
purposes, then the limitation will be deemed a legitimate one.  
However, the court must still determine if this legitimate limitation can be 
justified in a democratic society. This is the second stage. The inquiry in respect of the 
sections 24 and 25 internal limitation requires the court to determine if that provision 
stems from a law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The Constitution 
requires that the limiting measure be a reasonable one. An otherwise legitimate 
limitation may still fail the test when it is found not to be rationally connected to any of 
the purposes, as seen from the perspective of a democratic society.  
In the context of Maseko, the applicants were accused of uttering certain words 
which were regarded by the State as seditious, exhibiting an intention to cause 
disaffection amongst the population as well as create feelings of ill-will against the King 
of Swaziland. Some of the words uttered include "Viva PUDEMO Viva", "Phansi 
ngeTinkhundla Phansi" (translated "Down with the Tinkhundla system of government, 
Down – Tinkhundla is the bedrock of the "monarchical democracy" that sees the King at 
the apex of the political framework, and criminalises political opposition and political 
parties). These statements were regarded as potentially dangerous in that they would 
cause, amongst other things, "hatred and contempt towards His Majesty the King, his 
heirs or successors, or the Government of Swaziland".30 
In dealing with a constitutional claim based on the above, the question in relation 
to freedom of expression would be: "Whether a democratic society would reasonably 
justify the suppression of dissenting voices by a political superior?" Even if a particular 
law served the purpose of protecting public order and public morality (a very 
amorphous term) as set out in section 24(3), to the extent that it would not be regarded 
as reasonable in an open and democratic society,31 such law would fail the 
constitutionality test. 
Hence in paragraph 19, the majority judgment in Maseko decried the fact that 
nowhere in its affidavit did the respondent state why the limitation was necessary. 
Neither was its purpose stated. All that counsel for the State did was to tell the Court 
that the limitation or restriction was reasonably required in the interests of certain 
public purposes. The list included the purposes listed in section 24(3). Needless to say, 
the Court found this submission inadequate for the limitation analysis. 
30 Section 3(1)(a) of the Sedition Act. 
31 The limitation clause in sections 24 and 25 makes reference to "a democratic society", whilst the 
preamble regards Swaziland as "an open and democratic society". Hence the use of the two 
interchangeably throughout this article. 
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The Court, relying on Australian jurisprudence,32 proceeded to introduce the 
two-stage approach to Swaziland’s limitation analysis. It opined that two questions 
ought to be posed before the validity of the impugned provision can be determined. 
First, does the law effectively burden (or limit) a particular right? Secondly, if the law 
does indeed burden that right, is the law appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate 
end? If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, and that to the second one is 
in the negative, the law cannot be valid. 
This effectively means that for an impugned provision to pass constitutional 
muster under the section 24 internal limitation, it must pass two tests. First, the 
provision must be one that is required in the interests of public safety, morality, defence 
etc. Alternatively, the provision must be necessary to protect the rights of others, the 
integrity of the courts, or confidential information, or to regulate communications 
channels. Once that is established, the second leg of the enquiry relates to the 
reasonableness of the provision in a democratic society. 
For a court to effectively analyse a limiting measure it is imperative for the party 
alleging that the measure is justifiable to present the court with evidence in support of 
such assertion. This, as the Court stated in paragraph 19, must demonstrate the mischief 
that the limiting measure sought to curb or remedy. Only then can the reasonableness of 
the limiting measure be assessed. 
Section 25 of the Swaziland Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and 
association, and stipulates: 
"(1) A person has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
(2) A person shall not except with the free consent of that person be hindered in the 
enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, that is to say, the right to 
assemble peacefully and associate freely, with other persons for the promotion or protection 
of the interests of that person." 
Section 25 is limited in much the same way as section 24, by reference to the internal 
limitation. However, it must be noted that section 25 has an additional internal 
limitation, which was designed to restrain the enjoyment of the freedom of assembly 
and association by and through juristic persons. Section 25(4) provides: 
"Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2), nothing contained in or done under the 
authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the 
extent that the law in question makes provision –  
(a) for the registration of trade unions, employers organisations, companies … and other 
associations including provisions relating to the procedure for registration, prescribing 
qualifications for registration and authorising refusal of registration on the grounds that the 
prescribed qualifications are not fulfilled; or  
(b) for prohibiting or restricting the performance of any function or the carrying on of any 
business by any association as is mentioned in paragraph (a) which is not registered." 
It is our argument that section 25(4) was influenced by elements of "monarchical 
democracy", which have become deeply entrenched over the years. From 1973 to 2006 
when the current constitution came into force, the King ruled by virtue of a royal 
32 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation 145 ALR 96 (1997). 
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decree, the King’s Proclamation to the Nation of 12 April 1973.33 This decree was the 
supreme law, and conferred upon the King all judicial,34 legislative and executive 
powers.35 This is the same royal decree that banned all political parties, meaning that 
entities, such as PUDEMO, exist illegally to this day. 
The import of section 25(4) is that no natural person can attempt to or 
successfully register a political party in Swaziland. In essence it allows the State to make 
laws prohibiting the registration of certain organisations; and laws prohibiting the 
carrying out of any activities by juristic persons. The constitutional provision acts as an 
internal limitation in the sense that the rights of both juristic persons (for example, a 
political party) and natural persons (who could be members of a political party) to 
freely assembly and associate can be limited by legislation as and when the government 
decides. Such law shall not be held to be inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
problem is that section 25(4) does not contain the proportionality test which requires 
the law or the limiting measure to be assessed for its reasonableness in an open and 
democratic society. In the absence of a general limitation clause, this is a very 
unfortunate situation. 
The situation may not be too gloomy, given the growing rights centred 
jurisprudence coming out of the Swaziland courts. In any future challenge to such 
limiting laws the court could likely embark on a limitation analysis that takes into 
account the values that underlie the Swaziland Constitution. Further, the existence of 
legal precedent that stipulates the procedure for determining if a limiting measure is 
justifiable means that there is now precedent on which the court could rely to interpret 
any right in the Bill of Rights. The courts have already invoked several authorities from 
the South African jurisdiction to support their conclusion.36 Further, they have placed 
33 Through this royal decree, the then King, Sobhuza II, unilaterally abrogated the Independence 
Constitution, which did not have any clauses regulating its repeal, save for provisions regulating its 
amendment. King Sobhuza II announced the repeal and at the same time proclaimed: 
"I further declare that, to ensure the continued maintenance of peace, order and good 
government, my Armed Forces in conjunction with the Swaziland Royal Police have been 
posted to all strategic places and have taken charge of all government places and all 
public services." 
In para 11 of the Proclamation, the King decreed: 
"All political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring about disturbances and 
ill-feelings within the Nations are hereby dissolved and prohibited." 
34 In para 3 of the Proclamation, the King decreed: 
"NOW THEREFORE I, SOBHUZA II, King of Swaziland, hereby declare that, in collaboration 
with my Cabinet Ministers and supported by the whole nation, I have assumed supreme 
power in the Kingdom of Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and Judicial power 
is vested in myself." 
35 Dube & Nhlabatsi (2016) 267. 
36 See the following list of cases that the Court relied upon to adopt a limitation analysis based on the 
South African version: Gardener v Whitaker 1995 (2) SA 672 (E); S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA CC; Makwanyane; 
Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council: Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
Intervening (Women’s Legal Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2001 (4) SA 491 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v 
National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) and others 2005 (SA) 
280 (CC); and Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751. 
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reliance on Canadian jurisprudence to develop the limitation formula for Swaziland. For 
example, in The King v Swaziland Independent Publishers (Swaziland Independent 
Publishers),37 the Court cited with approval the Canadian approach in Queen v Oakes.38 It 
seems from the emerging jurisprudence that even in the absence of clear internal 
limitations, the Swaziland High Court is developing an overarching general limitation 
clause. 
6 THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE LIMITATION CLAUSE IN THE 
DISSENTING JUDGMENT 
Despite the progressive and generous interpretation of the Constitution that informed 
the majority judgment, the dissenting judgment of Hlophe J is a cause for concern. It 
should be noted from the outset that the Hlophe judgment seems to indicate a 
preconceived position on the part of the judge, that the applicants had no case at all. 
This was the first instance of misapplication of the limitation clause. Hlophe J believed 
that at the time the Court heard the application, no rights had been affected or 
threatened, and as such the applicants had no case.39  
Hlophe J based his reasoning on a misunderstanding of the law, in particular 
section 35 of the Constitution which regulates standing in the Swaziland context. The 
operative words in section 35 are that for an applicant to have standing, he must allege 
that any of his rights "has been, is being, or is likely to be" contravened. In the judge’s 
opinion, this can only happen after conviction. It is hard to reconcile this with the notion 
of transformative constitutionalism, where State institutions should be used to ensure 
fundamental rights and not to clamp down on dissenting political voices. It is our 
argument that as soon as the applicants were charged, several of their rights 
automatically fell within the category of rights which were either threatened or 
violated. These include freedom of movement as they were incarcerated as a result of 
the charges preferred against them. Further, their freedoms of expression, association 
and assembly were threatened by this law. The fact that when they moved their 
constitutional application all four applicants were out on bail lends credence to this 
argument. 
The second misapplication involved the creation of new jurisprudence in vacuo, 
much against established principles of constitutional litigation. Judge Hlophe did this 
when he held that the onus to prove that a limitation is not justifiable lies on the party 
alleging it, in other words, the applicant.40 This is not the position in Swaziland, as the 
High Court has already established otherwise. In Swaziland Independent Publishers,41 
the Court stated that the onus is on the party seeking to rely on the limitation, that is the 
37 [2013] SZHC 88. 
38 (1987) LRC (Crim). 
39 At para 20 of the dissenting judgment. 
40 At para 46 of the dissenting judgment. 
41 At paras 92 and 94. 
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respondent (State). This is similar to the position in South Africa, and the Swaziland 
courts have relied on South African cases that underscore that legal position. Judge 
Hlophe decided to create new law that is not supported by any jurisprudence. He 
insisted that the onus lies on the applicant, and he erroneously relied on Swaziland 
Independent Publishers. This is very concerning given that it poses a real risk that the 
public may lose confidence in the judiciary if judges will disregard the law as it stands 
and create their own rules which are not supported by any legal force. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The latest judgments to come from the Swaziland High Court, especially on 
constitutional issues, give hope that perhaps, after decades of royal supremacy, 
constitutional supremacy will finally be established. It seems from the few progressive 
judgments that have been handed down that a semblance of judicial independence is 
finally returning to the halls of justice. The reliance on the Constitution as a living 
document in the judgment of Mamba J indicates that transformative constitutionalism is 
now at the centre of judicial reasoning. There are still concerns though, given 
judgments, such as Hlophe J’s dissent in this case. His reasoning is still aligned with pre-
constitutional thinking, where any entity or individual that claimed rights that pitted 
them against "monarchical democracy" would not have a remedy before the Swaziland 
courts. Such a pre-constitutional stance tended to dispense with reason, and was 
motivated by emotions of loyalty to royalty instead of the independence and 
impartiality that ought to form the basis of the work of judges. This can be seen in 
Hlophe J’s disregard for existing jurisprudence on the limitation analysis. It is hoped 
that this newly-found momentum on the part of judges does not abate due to political 
pressure and intimidation. 
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